Clore, G. (1994b), 'Why Emotions Require Cognition', in Ekman and Davidson (eds). Clore, G. and Gaspar, K. (2000), “Some Affective Influences on Belief", in Frijda, Manstead, and Bem (eds). Cowan, R. (2011), Ethical Intuitionism, ...
An important part of Johnston's picture is that affect or feeling has a certain kind of “authority” over us. He writes: [I]t is because affect can be the disclosure of the appeal of other things and other people that it can have ...
Kelly, T. (2005) The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement', in J. Hawthorne and T. Gendler (eds) Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford ... Lewis, D. (1969) Convention: a Philosophical Study (Cambridge, Mass.
The aim of this book is to address this lack, by presenting original essays in the field of collective epistemology, exploring these regions of epistemic practice and their significance for Epistemology, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and ...
... pain sensation, in other words, but this pain sensation is not unpleasant and doesn't hurt. Is she suffering? It is difficult to think that she is, if we think that suffering is necessarily a bad state for her to be in, and correspondingly ...
... make claims which give others sufficient reasons for belief.3 If you legitimately hold epistemic authority But making political legitimacy dependent on the correctness of the 136 FABIENNE PETER 1. Practical and Epistemic Authority.