Most of the research on the epistemology of perception has focused on visual perception. This is hardly surprising given that most of our knowledge about the world is largely attributable to our visual experiences. The present volume is the first to instead focus on the epistemology of non-visual perception - hearing, touch, taste, and cross-sensory experiences. Drawing on recent empirical studies of emotion, perception, and decision-making, it breaks new ground on discussions of whether or not perceptual experience can yield justified beliefs and how to characterize those beliefs. The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception explores questions not only related to traditional sensory perception, but also to proprioceptive, interoceptive, multisensory, and event perception, expanding traditional notions of the influence that conscious non-visual experience has on human behavior and rationality. Contributors investigate the role that emotions play in decision-making and agential perception and what this means for justifications of belief and knowledge. They analyze the notion that some sensory experiences, like touch, have epistemic privilege over others, as well as perception's relationship to introspection, and the relationship between action perception and belief. Other essays engage with topics in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, exploring the role that artworks can play in providing us with perceptional knowledge of emotions. The essays collected here, written by top researchers in their respective fields, offer perspectives from a wide range of philosophical disciplines and will appeal to scholars interested in philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophical psychology, among others.
To try to provide an alternative way of resolving this dispute, Tim Bayne presents a phenomenal contrast based argument using the phenomenon, discussed above, of associative agnosia. Recall that associative agnosics seem to be able to ...
In this book Gerald Vision argues for a new causal theory, one that engages provocatively with direct realism and makes no use of a now discredited subjectivism.
In this first book-length examination of the Cartesian theory of visual perception, Celia Wolf-Devine explores the many philosophical implications of Descartes' theory, concluding that he ultimately failed to provide a...
The work presents chapters on forms of natural realism; theories of perceptual experience; representationalism; the argument from illusion; phenomenological senses; types of perceptual content; the representationalist/intentionalist thesis; ...
In this book, Brit Brogaard defends the view that visual experience is like belief in having a representational content.
Some of the essays in this book defend the orthodoxy; most criticize it; and some propose alternatives to it. Many of the essays are classics.
New York: Oxford University Press. (2002). ''Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles,'' Philosophical Review 111: 373–416. (2004a). Review of Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology, by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Mind, 113: 405–16. (2004b).
In The Innocent Eye, Nico Orlandi defends a position that aligns with this second, world-centered tradition, but that also respects some of the insights of constructivism.
This book is a discussion of some of the major philosophical problems centering around the topic of sense perception and the foundations of human knowledge.
This book is about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs.