The Gettier Problem has shaped most of the fundamental debates in epistemology for more than fifty years. Before Edmund Gettier published his famous 1963 paper, it was generally presumed that knowledge was equivalent to true belief supported by adequate evidence. Gettier presented a powerful challenge to that presumption. This led to the development and refinement of many prominent epistemological theories, for example, defeasibility theories, causal theories, conclusive-reasons theories, tracking theories, epistemic virtue theories, and knowledge-first theories. The debate about the appropriate use of intuition to provide evidence in all areas of philosophy began as a debate about the epistemic status of the 'Gettier intuition'. The differing accounts of epistemic luck are all rooted in responses to the Gettier Problem. The discussions about the role of false beliefs in the production of knowledge are directly traceable to Gettier's paper, as are the debates between fallibilists and infallibilists. Indeed, it is fair to say that providing a satisfactory response to the Gettier Problem has become a litmus test of any adequate account of knowledge even those accounts that hold that the Gettier Problem rests on mistakes of various sorts. This volume presents a collection of essays by twenty-six experts, including some of the most influential philosophers of our time, on the various issues that arise from Gettier's challenge to the analysis of knowledge. Explaining Knowledge sets the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.
In this book the philosopher of science, John Wright delves deep into science's methodology to offer an explanation for this remarkable success story.
The first comprehensive exploration of the nature and value of understanding, addressing burgeoning debates in epistemology and philosophy of science.
In this book, epistemologists and philosophers of science together address basic questions about the nature of understanding, providing a new overview of the field.
Series Editor: J. John Loughran,Monash University, Clayton, Australia Editorial Board: Renee Clift – University of Arizona, USA Ruth Kane – Ottawa University, Canada MiekeLunenberg – Free University, The Netherlands Anthony Clarke ...
This is the second book produced from the Monash University- King’s College London International Centre for the Study of Science and Mathematics Curriculum.
This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge.
There has been a growing interest in the notion of a scholarship of teaching.
This open access book – as the title suggests – explores some of the historical roots and epistemological ramifications of perspectivism.
... knowledge Characteristics of science knowledge have been explained by many scholars; science information is tentative, meaning that it changes if an evidence for the new knowledge is identified (Abd-El- Khalick & Lederman, 2000a). Science ...
How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of how-possible questions in epistemology. Quassim Cassam explains how such questions arise and how they should be answered.