What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis?
In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori.
Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, and characterizes the latter using a novel epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is then applied to philosophical and historical issues. Solutions are provided to the "grue," "ravens," "lottery," and "old-evidence" paradoxes, and to a series of questions. These include whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight, whether individual hypotheses or entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support, what counts as a scientific discovery, and what sort of evidence is required for it. The historical questions include whether Jean Perrin had non-circular evidence for the existence of molecules, what type of evidence J. J. Thomson offered for the existence of the electron, and whether, as is usually supposed, he really discovered the electron. Achinstein proposes answers in terms of the concepts of evidence introduced.
As the premier book in the fabulous new series Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science, this volume is essential for philosophers of science and historians of science, as well as for statisticians, scientists with philosophical interests, and anyone curious about scientific reasoning.
Growing global linkages and complexity are redressing the paradox aptly characterized by sociologist Daniel Bell in the last century , “ government is too big for the small problems of our society and too small for the big ones .
Is scientific theory really just a matter of persuasion? Do scientists merely invent rather than discover? Do scientists merely invent rather than discover? Indeed, do brute facts of nature gain meaning only within a rhetorical context?
A head of the Human Genome Project and former atheist presents a scientific argument for the existence of God, revealing how science can support faith by citing the areas of nature that can and cannot be fully explained by Darwinian ...
克勒克.馬克士威( )以科期而言相當穩定,因為他們本身存在某種劑量的波動性。險特性,同樣不同於由自治市領導,一團混亂的共和國。第二種風險特性長)大為不同。中央集權系統的風建模,並用數學式指出,緊密控制蒸汽機的速度,反而造成不穩定。斯威爾一八六七年 ...
別擔心誰知道也許最後會以喜劇收場對一個出象的結果加以塞克斯都代表並立下庇羅派懷疑主義庇羅派追求源自擱置信仰的某種科即為經驗的意義是科學並把其醫術隔絕於教條科學的問題之外其醫術進一步解釋了塞克斯都名字裡的恩披里是曼諾多圖斯融合經驗主義和 ...
當時已經以格林威治的皇家天文臺為中心。是無所不通的虎克所計畫的;當時他與雷恩爵士在大火( Great Fire )之後再建倫敦。航海者離岸很遠時,要定出自己的位置(經、緯度) ,就可以把他對星星的讀數與格林威治的讀數比較。
■ 網路革命、數位科技帶來的經濟不平等、社會人際疏離、文化沉淪、數位民主、全球壟斷、民粹統治、隱私的終結、科技性失業、數位成癮等政經社會困境,本書提供我們逃出生 ...
A thoroughly revised and I hope improved account of that investigation appears in the first five chapters of this book. Put very briefly, what I found were four main points of contention.
When software systems are delivered too late, when they fail to meet the needs of their users, when only a fraction of their capacity is used, when their maintenance costs...
Is science our most precious possession or has our culture elevated science into a false idol? Is technology a useful servant or a malign genie? These questions are at the...