In an ideal world, our beliefs would satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as foster the acquisition, retention, and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis. We may also experience impairments in perception, memory, learning, and reasoning in the course of our lives. Such limitations and impairments give rise to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, and beliefs that are elaborated delusional, motivated delusional, or optimistically biased. In this book, Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where, in some contexts, the adoption, maintenance, or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs, yet it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade-off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness, which in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.
Breen, N., Caine, D., and Coltheart, M. (2000). Models of face recognition and ... Breen, N., Caine, D., Coltheart, M., Hendy, J., and Roberts, C. (2000). Towards an understanding of ... Peters, E., Garety, P., and McGuire, P. (2007).
The philosophy of psychosis and the psychosis of philosophy: a philosopher draws on his experience of madness. In this book, philosopher and linguist Wouter Kusters examines the philosophy of psychosis—and the psychosis of philosophy.
This book challenges the view that bad beliefs - beliefs that blatantly conflict with easily available evidence - can largely be explained by widespread irrationality, instead arguing that ordinary people are rational agents whose beliefs ...
In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions really are and that despite their negative reputation, that they can also play a positive role in someone's life, such as providing meaning to people's experiences and ...
Conspiracy theories and false knowledge thrive. This may be the Information Age, but we do not seem to be well informed. In this book, philosopher Daniel DeNicola explores ignorance -- its abundance, its endurance, and its consequences.
D. Salehi, 97–122, Frankfurt: Peter Lang. —— (2002a). 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and Closure', Theoria 68, 129–61. —— (2002b). 'Recent Work on Radical Skepticism', American Philosophical Quarterly 39, 215–57.
This open access book offers an exploration of delusions—unusual beliefs that can significantly disrupt people’s lives.
This volume comprises twelve new essays by leading researchers in the philosophy of reasoning that together address these questions and many more, and explore the connections between them.
This book presents a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perception that is informed by empirical research.
In Causation with a Human Face, James Woodward integrates these lines of research and argues for an understanding of how each can inform the other: normative ideas can suggest interesting experiments, while descriptive results can suggest ...