Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief
ISBN-10
0199658307
ISBN-13
9780199658305
Category
Mathematics
Pages
345
Language
English
Published
2013
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Author
Michael G. Titelbaum

Description

Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework. Subjective Bayesianism is epistemologists' standard theory of how individuals should change their degrees of belief over time. But despite the theory's power, it is widely recognized to fail for situations agents face every day. Michael G. Titelbaum argues that these failures stem from a common source: the inability ofConditionalization (Bayesianism's traditional updating rule) to model claims' going from certainty at an earlier time to less-than-certainty later on. He presents the first systematic, comprehensive Bayesianframework to accurately represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. Titelbaum compares the framework he proposes to alternatives, then applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and the philosophy of quantum mechanics. This is the first unified Bayesian framework capable of accurately modeling rational requirements in cases involving memory loss and context-sensitivity. It has applications to suchdiverse topics as indifference principles, relations among epistemic peers, Everettian interpretations of quantum mechanics, the Fine-Tuning Argument for the multiverse, and the controversial SleepingBeauty problem. Titelbaum develops his ambitious project with rigor and philosophical subtlety: the book makes a major contribution to the literature on formal epistemology.

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