The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency--a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results. Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization.
35 Maybe it is not fair to blame T. E. Lawrence for this paradox—of reducible but unduplicable insight. 36 Lawrence was, after all, quite specific that his “Twenty-seven Articles,” which represented his compilation of what worked among ...
This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on COIN; analyzes COIN operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about...
On 21 February , Henry Hogan and Declan Martin spotted the SAS hide . Requesting orders , they were told to capture the soldiers that night . The SAS men were taken by surprise from the rear and , as they The SAS have always operated in ...
2, 62; Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 29, 1918, vol. 2, 144; Link, Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Sir Cecil Rice to the Foreign Office, December 27, 1917, vol. 45, 370; December 29, 1917, vol. 45, 393; Lord Robert Cecil to the ...
See Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice, New York: Potomac Books, 2002; ... Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice, New York: Knopf, 1971, challenges Taber's argument.
Though carefully documented, the book is written in an accessible style that makes it ideal for readers at all levels, from undergraduates to professional historians.
Busch, All the Way with JFK?, 84. 22. McGeorge Bundy, oral history interview #3, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Digital Oral History Program, http://archive2.jfklibrary.org/JFKOH/Bundy, %20McGeorge/JFKOH-MGB-03/JFKOH-MGB-03-TR.pdf ...
Lawrence Yates , Power Pack : U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic ( Fort Leavenworth , Kans .: Combat Studies Institute , 1988 ) , pp . 14–66 ; Blechman and Kaplan , Force Without War , pp . 291–93 , 303–08 ; Lawrence Greenberg ...
Providing access to the capabilities of the world's leading police and security equipment and their suppliers, this guide reviews over 1300 items, including secure communications, access control, surveillance equipment, firearms and ...
U.S. Army counterinsurgency and contingency operations doctrine, 1942-1976 (Paperbound)