This book is about the role of negotiation in resolving terrorist barricade hostage crises. What lessons can be learned from past deadly incidents so that crisis negotiators and decision makers can act with greater effectiveness in the future? What are the lessons the terrorists are learning and how will they affect the dynamics of future incidents? What can we learn about the terrorist threat, and about preventing the escalation of future terrorist hostage-taking situations?
While there are many trained crisis negotiators around the world, almost none of them has ever had contact with a terrorist hostage-taking incident. Further, the entire training program of most hostage negotiators focuses on resolving crises that do not take into consideration issues such as ideology, religion, or the differing sets of strategic objectives and mindsets of ideological hostage takers. This is especially true with regard to the terrorists of the new breed, who have become less discriminate, more lethal, and more willing to execute hostages and die during the incident. Further, many of the paradigms and presumptions upon which the contemporary practice of crisis negotiation is based do not reflect the reality of the new terrorists.
The main focus of this book is on the detailed reconstruction and analysis of the two most high-profile cases in recent years, the Moscow theater and the Beslan school hostage crises, with a clear purpose of drawing lessons for hostage negotiation strategies in the future. This is an issue of top priority. Terrorist manuals from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq reveal that terrorist organizations are very closely observing and analyzing the lessons learned from these two incidents, suggesting that we are likely to see this type of new terrorist hostage taking involving large numbers of suicide fighters and executions of hostages at some point in the future. This raises a wide array of questions about appropriate responses and negotiation strategies. From the first glance, it is clear that we are not prepared.
Criminology / Delinquency BECOME GIRLS DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE MEDA CHESNEY - LIND AND RANDALL G. SHELDEN GIRLS , DELINQUENCY , AND JUVENILE JUSTICE a Third Edition Internet for research through searches and activities .
And how did the public hear what he said, especially as it was filtered through the news media? The eloquent and thoughtful Bush's War shows how public perception of what the president says is shaped by media bias.
having to exert direct pressure : LEVIN : Now , prior to the war [ the invasion of Iraq in 2003 ] , the If a political official tells the intelligence community to look. undersecretary of defense for policy , Mr. Feith , established an ...
駐台北以色列經濟文化辦事處代表 何璽夢(Simona Halperin) 台北市召會長老 吳有成 國安評論員 李天鐸 台灣ICEJ(台灣耶路撒冷國際基督徒協會)理事長 Joseph Chou ...
Presents an analysis of the Bush Administration's efforts to stop Al Qaeda and cites a number of instances where their anti-terror efforts have been successful in protecting the United States...
The purpose of this study was to identify key potential users of high-performance computing (HPC) within the Army science and technology community and any barriers that prevent full use of current and planned HPC resources.
Their photographs, by turns haunting, surreal, and breathtaking, are collected together in New York September 11, by Magnum Photographers, compellingly presented in this high-quality edition from powerHouse Books.
Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group that reviewed the situation on the ground and proposed ways of improving security, strengthening the new government, rebuilding the economy, and maintaining stability in the region.
Just as the mainstream U.S. media appear to have largely missed the real story of "Operational Prairie Fire," it may have also missed (until Seymour Hersh's delayed and diminished rejoinder) the next chapter. On April 5, 1986, ...
... 90 defense spending and, 151, 152 Iran and, 120, 150, 170–171, 182 promotion ofvalues and, 60, 85, 132 casualties, in military actions, 152–153, 195–196 Middle East and, 119–125 in National Security Strategy, 61–65 Powell's 218 Index C.