Historians have portrayed British participation in World War I as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, with untried new military technology, and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book a renowned military historian studies the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies failed persistently during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology, and, eventually, its' self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the fall of 1918, says Paddy Griffith, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during World War II. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties, but that breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. According to Griffith, the British were already masters of "storm troop tactics" by the end of 1916, and in several important respects were further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, "Commando-style" trench raiding, the use of light machine guns, or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, says Griffith, they should at least be credited for effectively inventing much of the twentieth-century's art of war.
This is a thorough examination of the campaigns of the “war to end all wars.” It analyzes the development of military theory and practice from the prewar period of Bismark’s Prussia to the creation of the League of Nations.
Rally Once Again: Battle Tactics of the American Civil War
Written by an internationally renowned expert on tactics and one of its generals, this is a definitive exploration of the Imperial German Army's art of war, from the trenches of France to the expanse of Eastern Europe to the Italian Alps.
The trench-warfare stalemate of World War I was the virtually inevitable result of new technology and the cultural mindset of the times. The machine gun had made the battlefield unhabitable...
The book discusses the importance of Military Strategy and Tactics during conflicts with some proven examples.
Analyzes the events, weapons, and strategies of the Civil War and argues that the introduction of modern weaponry did not have significant effect on the outcome or the conduct of the war
Although during World War I the United States employed observers on the battlefields of the Western Front, the information they provided lacked the substance and conclusions required to evolve the tactical doctrine of the American ...
This is a thorough examination of the campaigns of the "war to end all wars." It analyzes the development of military theory and practice from the prewar period of Bismark's Prussia to the creation of the League of Nations.
In this book, Captain Cyril Falls, known in British academic and governmental circles as an expert in military history, discusses the military side of World War I in the light of its battles, tactics and weapons; its problems of supply and ...
John J. Pershing. Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1919) Watson, A., Enduring the Great War. Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: ...