Public choice theory should be taken seriously--but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions. While Mashaw addresses perennial questions of constitutional law, legislative interpretation, administrative law, and the design of public institutions, he arrives at innovative conclusions. Countering the positions of key public choice theorists, Mashaw finds public choice approaches virtually useless as an aid to the interpretation of statutes, and he finds public choice arguments against delegating political decisions to administrators incoherent. But, using the tools of public choice analysts, he reverses the lawyers' conventional wisdom by arguing that substantive rationality review is not only legitimate but a lesser invasion of legislative prerogatives than much judicial interpretation of statutes. And, criticizing three decades of "law reform," Mashaw contends that pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules has seriously undermined both governmental capacity and the rule of law.
Explains how administrative government maintains mutual respect among citizens, legitimates administrative government under law, and supports a realistic vision of democracy.
This insightful work provides a unifying vision of these programs’ purposes and reminds us, amidst the confusing and often apocalyptic rhetoric, why we have the programs and policies we do, while arguing for reforms that preserve and ...
See, generally, Peter L. Strauss, Todd D. Rakoff, Cynthia R. Farina, & Gillian E. Metzger, eds., Gellhorn and Byse's Administrative Law: Cases and Comments, 11th ed. (2011). Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (1922). John J. DiIulio Jr., ...
Thomas L. Friedman, “Big Mac I,” New York Times, December 8, 1996. 31.Steve Quinn, “Halliburton's 3Q Earnings Hit $611M,” Associated Press, October 22, 2006. 32. Steven R. Hurst, “October Deadliest Month Ever in Iraq,” Associated Press, ...
"Historians investigating the financial collapse of '08–'09 must begin by reading this book. This is close-range reporting . . . the work of a veteran financial journalist who was 'present at the creation' of this crisis.
JL Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance (Yale University Press, 1997), at 152. This view of the role of representation in government shares some similarities with traditional republican theories in the form discussed, ...
Similarly , Michael Smith and Stephen Woolcock found a " radical structural change affecting European / American relations , ” consisting of the end of the Cold War , a balancing of US - EU economic clout , and the increasing ...
2000. Democratic Commitments : Legislatures and International Cooperation . Princeton , N.J .: Princeton University Press . Mashaw , Jerry L. 1997. Greed , Chaos , and Governance : Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law .
Greed, Chaos, & Governance—Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997). ——, 'Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State', (2001) 70 Fordham Law ...
Hood, C., H. Rothstein and R. Baldwin (2001), The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes, ... Mashaw, J. (1997), Greed, Chaos and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law, Yale University Press, ...