The standard account of the persistence of objects through time and change is the classical theory of spatio-temporal continuity. It is thought that an informative grounding of identity can be given in terms of what is seen to be a common-sense notion. Apart from being prone to numerous counter-examples which show continuity to be neither necessary nor sufficient for identity, it is also shown to require an ontology of temporal parts by which persisting objects are reduced to collections of temporally extended segments or stages. It is this ontology, and the reductionism it implies that is the subject of the author's criticism. It is the orthodox theory of identity over time, inspired by David Hume and adhered to by the vast majority of contemporary theorists. Identity and change, the very idea of unitary persisting objects, are seen as metaphysically illusory. The author shows that this sceptical theory is, contrary to the opinion of its supporters, unwarranted by the modern physics of space-time, and conceptually incoherent. It is argued that reductionism must be discarded and that theorists must abandon the attempt to find an informative analysis of identity. Rather, it should be seen as metaphysically basic, and the problems and puzzle cases of identity must be dealt with in that light.
What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? In this book, André Gallois introduces and assesses the philosophical puzzles posed by things persisting through time.
This volume of original essays brings together these two essentially related concepts in a way not reflected in the available literature, making it required reading for philosophers working in metaphysics and students interested in these ...
The conflict between the four theses concerning time, causation, and consciousness is set out in more detail in Le Poidevin (2011). ... Questions of Time and Tense (185–205). oxford: Clarendon Press. oaklander, L.n. (1999).
This volume is a collection of new essays from leading figures in the field analyzing the persistence of persons and the criteria of personal identity over time.
Jonathan Lowe argues that metaphysics should be restored to a central position in philosophy, as the most fundamental form of rational inquiry, whose findings underpin those of all other disciplines.
These examples and Locke's metaphysics of the self make interrupted existence a plausible reading, though Locke is not explicit. If he thinks the self is merely suppressed in any of the examples, he does not say so or explain.12 Thomas ...
In this exploration of timeless philosophical issues regarding persistence, change, time, and sameness Andre Gallois offers a critical survey of a number of rival views about the nature of identity and change and proposes his own original ...
It is simply in the nature oflaws ofmotion that they describe how earlier states ofmotion of a given object help to determine subsequent states of motion of the same object. It was circularity of this sort that made VV.
First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
This volume presents fourteen new essays by leading figures in the fields of ancient philosophy and contemporary metaphysics, discussing Aristotle's theory of the unity of substances.