Originally published in 1987. In the debate over strategic defense, the Soviet dimension has not been adequately examined. Dr. Parrott's multifaceted discussion of the Soviet approach to ballistic missile defense (BMD) admirably fills that gap. Based on an analysis of Soviet statements and Soviet weaponry, the study surveys Soviet perceptions of the shifting relationship between the superpowers and the effect of BMD on that relationship. The author then traces the evolution of Soviet policies toward ballistic missile defense and the introduction of weapons into space. After exploring the internal budgetary debates that will affect future Soviet decisions on BMD and space systems, the book outlines Soviet responses, political as well as military, to the Strategic Defense Initiative and concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy toward BMD and arms negotiations.
The volume editors give a comprehensive introduction to this wide range of subjects and an assessment of future prospects.
Roger W. Barnett , " Trans - SALT : Soviet Strategic Doctrine , " Orbis , 19 ( Summer 1975 ) , 554-555 , 558 . 28. Brown , Defense Annual Report FY 1980 , p . 35 ; Marshall , " Arms Competitions , " p .
The possible effects of ABM on non-proliferation are also discussed. The text also takes a look at strategic arms control and stability.
The first question concerns the means that leaders chose for defense against an increasingly sophisticated offensive threat. Includes several appendices of chronologies, tables, charts, maps and notes.
I denne amerikanske studie undersøges sovjetiske perspektiver i spørgsmål om USSR militære og sikkerhedspolitiske strategier
38 In the conventional forces area, the Aspin recommendations were remarkably close to those made by the Bush ... 38 39 Gordon, M., ... Aspin favored cu ing spending from the $39 billion level recommended by Bush to $18 billion.
Fortress USSR: The Soviet Strategic Defense Initiative and the U.S. Strategic Defense Response
Ballistic missile defense technologies.
... into the ideological debate over the nature and purposes of Soviet power, thereby creating a closed loop that was almost impossible to break—and merely increased in intensity during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations.
Cover -- Half Title -- Dedication -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1 The Strategic Defence Initiative -- 2 The Soviet Reaction to the SDI -- 3 The Reykjavik Summit: October 11-12 ...