Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation.
This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging.
This is one of the most interesting contributions to nuclear deterrence theory. It is a fascinating study of how real people--experts and nonexperts--think about nuclear deterrence and arms control.
This book offers a broader theory of nuclear deterrence and examines the way nuclear and conventional deterrence interact with non-military factors in a series of historical case studies.
Sechser and Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail.” 2. Todd S. Sechser, “Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001,” Conflict Management and 12. 13. 14. 15. Peace Science 28, no. 4 (2011): 377–401. 3.
Thomas C. Schelling. Union—showed unmistakable signs of response to the Western response, a feedback cycle. According to Thomas W. Wolfe, author of the introduction to one of the American translations of the volume, the Soviet authors ...
Deterrence Theory: Nuclear Weapons and the United States catalogs nuclear weapons development in the United States.
Contributed articles from a seminar held in Nov. 2005 at the Delhi Policy Group.
This book critically examines U.S. attempts to establish a nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union and offers new approaches to dealing with the changing strategic environment.
Deterrence by Denial is an important book for scholars of international relations, political science, terrorism and intelligence studies, and cybersecurity.
The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's ...