Guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good Central bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from the people. Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens. Paul Tucker draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. He explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power. Like it or not, unelected power has become a hallmark of modern government. This critically important book shows how to harness it to the people's purposes.
9 law professors from Yale and the University of Michigan: Charles E. Clark, “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Federal Civil Procedure,” 44 Yale Law Journal 387, 1291 (1935); Charles E. Clark, “Edson Sunderland and the ...
This book argues that Congress's process for making law is as corrosive to the nation as unchecked deficit spending.
Chapter 7 WILL REVAMPED FINANCIAL REGULATIONS WORK?
How could they possibly be legitimate? This book is of key interest to scholars and students of democracy, governance, and more broadly to political and administrative science as well as the Science Technology Studies (STS).
Along the way, this book sharpens readers' sense of who the US oligarchy are, including how their fortunes have changed over the course of US history, how they live and think and how to detect and de-cloak them.
This book examines the challenge that unelected bodies such as economic regulators present to democracy, and argues that they should be seen as a new branch of government and held to account through a new separation of powers.
Now the subject of modern conspiracy theories the world over as a worrying trend toward unelected power emerges, this book is more timely than ever, and helps separate fact from fiction.
An award-winning public policy expert and author of Collision and Collusion explains how an elite group of power-wielding agenda promoters are erasing the boundaries between government, private and non-profit organizations for their own ...
Those who implement policies have the discretion to shape democratic values. Public administration is not policy administered, but democracy administered.
Lee, Frances E. 2015. “How Party Polarization Affects Governance.” Annual Review of Political Science 18:261–82. Lee, Soo-Young, and Andrew B. Whitford. 2012. “Assessing the Effects of Organizational Resources on Public Agency ...