The role of science in policymaking has gained unprecedented stature in the United States, raising questions about the place of science and scientific expertise in the democratic process. Some scientists have been given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance, and the politicizing of these issues has become highly contentious. Since World War II, most philosophers of science have purported the concept that science should be “value-free.” In Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal, Heather E. Douglas argues that such an ideal is neither adequate nor desirable for science. She contends that the moral responsibilities of scientists require the consideration of values even at the heart of science. She lobbies for a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, thus protecting the integrity and objectivity of science. In this vein, Douglas outlines a system for the application of values to guide scientists through points of uncertainty fraught with moral valence. Following a philosophical analysis of the historical background of science advising and the value-free ideal, Douglas defines how values should-and should not-function in science. She discusses the distinctive direct and indirect roles for values in reasoning, and outlines seven senses of objectivity, showing how each can be employed to determine the reliability of scientific claims. Douglas then uses these philosophical insights to clarify the distinction between junk science and sound science to be used in policymaking. In conclusion, she calls for greater openness on the values utilized in policymaking, and more public participation in the policymaking process, by suggesting various models for effective use of both the public and experts in key risk assessments.
The contributors to this volume investigate where and how values are involved in science, and examine the implications of this involvement for ideals of objectivity.
Scriven, Michael. “The Exact Role of Value Judgments in Science.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972 (1972): 219–47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3698971. Selgelid, Michael J.
But in this new work, the author goes far beyond that earlier book in studying places at which the practice of science fails to answer social needs.
An Introduction to Values in Science Kevin C. Elliott ... A TAPESTRY OF VALUES As we saw in the preceding chapters, and as table 8.1 summarizes, values can play a wide range of legitimate roles in scientific reasoning.
The book includes an introductory chapter that provides a conceptual introduction to the topic and a historical overview of the argument that values have an important role to play in responding to inductive risk, as well as a concluding ...
Collection of essays that identify the values crucial to science, distinguish some of the criteria that can be used for value identification, and elaborate the conditions for warranting certain values as necessary or central to scientific ...
The volume gives a multi-perspective overview of scholarly and science communication, exploring its diverse functions, modalities, interactional structures, and dynamics in a rapidly changing world.
The book includes lessons learned along the way, advice on new skills, practices for individual researchers, elements necessary for institutional change, and knowledge areas and processes in which to invest.
This book explores vaccine hesitancy and refusal among parents in the industrialized North.
He also focuses on discussions of 'development', especially in Third World countries. This paperback edition includes a new preface.