As the U.S. Army transforms its combat force, inevitably the institutional Army -- the "generating force" that fills and sustains the Army's combat units -- must change as well. Stabilizing soldiers at posts and in units demands different personnel and training routines from those that supported the Army's long-standing "individual replacement" system. Developing and fielding an integrated "system of systems" and delivering it in sets to units entering the force-generation cycle also call for generating force activities markedly different from those mastered in years past. And a whole series of supporting organizations must adapt to the global deployments of an Army that will be based largely in the United States rather than overseas. Transformation of the institutional Army is surely as dramatic as the transformation of the Army's combat force. Yet, it is far less well understood. Over many years, the Army has developed an array of metrics to assess the performance of its combat units. Not surprisingly, the current Army Campaign Plan (ACP) and Army Posture Statement (APS) offer clear and fairly succinct visions for this part of the force: The Army seeks a more joint-oriented, expeditionary, modular, rebalanced, stabilized, and brigade-based operating force. When these documents turn to the institutional Army, by contrast, they say that the Army will use fewer resources to provide better support to the warfighter. A method is needed for aligning the operational and institutional portions of the Army for transformational purposes. This project, launched by then-Vice Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr., explains how to evaluate value chains to develop information that can promote such alignment. It formally evaluates value chains to develop illustrative high-level performance metrics relevant to the alignment of institutional medical, enlisted accessioning, and short-term acquisition services to the operating force.
Throughout America's history, U.S. Army officers have played an integral role in the formulation and execution of its national security policy. Future national security challenges will be markedly different from...
Army operations research—Historical perspectives and lessons learned. ... The struggle to transform the military. ... What the army needs to know to align its operational and institutional activities (Report Number MG-530-A).
“Scenes from the Activation and Change of Command Ceremony for 2nd Squadron, 14th Cavalry held on Watkins Field at Fort Lewis, WA, on 16 May 2002.” As of December 1, 2006: http://www.14cav.org/r2a-ceremony.html.
... Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, 543–76; Todd S. Brown, Battleground Iraq: Journal of a Company Commander (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 2007), 231–36; Army General Staff Council Meeting notes, ...
As such, strategic engagement comprises another measure of strategic effectiveness. Engagement Engagement between like-minded military institutions and like-minded nations must continue to evolve and embrace a greater sharing of ideas ...
Over the past decade, especially, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) intelligence has had to tailor its organization to meet the evolving demands of the operational environment.
Army installations are not authorized to relocate or close DTFs without approval of TRADOC DCS, G–3/5/7 DLD. ... training. o. Develop Army Correspondence Course Program courses/modules as interactive multimedia 40 AR 350–1 • 19 August 2014.
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations. 18 August 2016. ATP 3-07.5. ... ATP 4-32. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations. 30 September 2013. ATP 4-32.1. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) ...