This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on COIN; analyzes COIN operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about COIN, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future COIN operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct COIN in the future. For example, U.S. COIN experience in Iraq has revealed the need to achieve synergy and balance among several simultaneous civilian and military efforts and the need to continually address and reassess the right indicators to determine whether current strategies are adequate. The need to continually reassess COIN strategy and tactics implies that military and civilian leaders must have not only the will, but also a formal mechanism, to fearlessly and thoroughly call to the attention of senior decisionmakers any shortfalls in policies and practices, e.g., in Iraq, failure to protect the civilian population, as well as overreliance on technological approaches to COIN. The Iraq experience is particularly germane to drawing lessons about COIN. In essence, the conflict there is a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by fanatical foreign jihadists and criminal opportunists--a combination of factors likely to be replicated in insurgencies elsewhere.
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations.
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations.
Jihad leaders might not be as concerned as we think with winning broad popular support in the Muslim world.30 They appeal to those who, already alienated, will not be offended, and may even be impressed, by violence.
This study examines how terrorist groups transition to insurgencies and identifies ways to combat proto-insurgents.
This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the ...
The complexity and sensitivity of counterinsurgency call for vastly better use of IT than has been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here is a practical plan for just that.
During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power.
This study makes recommendations for improving COIN based on RAND??s decades-long study of it.
Current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is in need of stronger cognitive capabilities that will enable the United States to "fight smarter.
Ben Connable, Martin C. Libicki. The research described in this report was prepared for the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. The research was conducted in the National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and ...