This document suggests that the West has been surprised by the characteristics of global insurgency. The West's collective military experience and existing doctrine did not anticipate a campaign so energized by spiritual, global, and virtual dimensions; they were not prepared for the multifaceted characteristics of the international response that the adversary has compelled. This document argues that in a longer campaign beyond Iraq, U.S.--led coalitions will have to become part of a mosaic of activities that are globally spread, politically driven, more internationally constituted, and manoeuvrist in concept. It describes the foreign policy problems associated with moving from counterterrorism into a genuine counterinsurgent strategy and summarizes the existing practical experience of coalitions.
Hull, Edmund J., High-Value Target: Countering al Qaeda in Yemen, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011. ... “Pericles, Thucydides, and the Defense of Empire,” in Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome, (ed.) ...
When Bad States Win challenges the belief that democratic institutions and economic growth are effectual tools in countering insurgencies.
When Bad States Win challenges the belief that democratic institutions and economic growth are effectual tools in countering insurgencies.
In the concluding parts of this monograph, Dr. Sloan addresses a number of additional views for improving upon the traditional approaches in order to deal with international and virtual threats, including a need to be keenly focused upon ...
In the concluding parts of this monograph, Dr. Sloan addresses a number of additional views for improving upon the traditional approaches in order to deal with international and virtual threats, including a need to be keenly focused upon ...
Current United States counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine espoused in Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency is inadequate for the realities of the complex security environment that exist in the world today.
Based on analysis of the outcomes of historical case studies of COIN operations and what portends to be the future of warfare, this book argues that we create a definition of "success" for the termination of a COIN operation and replace the ...
In any conflict, the definition of what constitutes "victory" and who defines "victory" can remain fluid and this is especially true in COIN.
In this monograph, Dr. Steven Metz, who has been writing on insurgency and counterinsurgency for more than 2 decades, argues that this relearning process, while exceptionally important, emphasized the wrong thing, focusing on Cold War era ...
The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War when other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more...