RAND studied 89 modern insurgency cases to test conventional understanding about how insurgencies end. Findings relevant to policymakers and analysts include that modern insurgencies last about ten years; withdrawal of state support cripples insurgencies; civil defense forces are useful for both sides; pseudodemocracies fare poorly against insurgents; and governments win more often in the long run.
An analysis of insurgent warfare, looking at factors that contribute to insurgency.
"Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency.
This study examines how terrorist groups transition to insurgencies and identifies ways to combat proto-insurgents.
The continuing proliferation of insurgent organizations suggests that insurgency is still widely perceived as an effective means either of achieving power and influence, or of bringing a cause to the...
This is a counter organizational operational construct, not a strategy in-of-itself, as has happened with counterterrorism-a counter "tactic"-turned strategy.
Why do only some incipient rebel groups become viable challengers to governments? Only those that control local rumor networks survive.
This edited collection examines the British ‘way’ in counter-insurgency.
Field Manual FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies May 2014 provides doctrine for Army and Marine units that are countering an insurgency.
This companion volume to Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies offers in-depth case studies of 41 insurgencies since World War II. Each case breaks the conflict into phases and examines the trajectory that led to the outcome.
The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen.