The basis of nuclear doctrine during the cold war was deterrence. Nuclear powers were deterred from attacking each other by the fear of retaliation. Today, much of the concern over possible nuclear attack comes in the context of rogue states and terrorism. And since only states are known to possess nuclear weapons, an important question is how to deter them from letting terrorists acquire a device, whether through an authorized transfer or a security breach. Michael A. Levi analyzes this aspect of deterrence in the post–cold war world, as well as what to do if deterrence breaks down. He suggests how to discourage states from giving weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists and how to encourage states to bolster security against any accidental transfer. He also challenges the assumption, implicit in most discussion, that developing a technical ability to attribute nuclear attacks will automatically yield "deterrence" against state sponsorship. In doing that, the report moves the policy debate from its current focus on technology to one that is equally about strategy and thus offers thoughtful analysis and practical guidelines for U.S. policy on a complex and important issue.
This book challenges that prevailing assumption and offers insight as to when and where terrorism can be deterred.
Patricia Dorff kindly helped guide me through the publication process. I was also aided by two excellent research associates. Ripal Patel ably supported me during my first months at the Council. Susan Basu joined later, tracking down ...
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism
The United States policy for dealing with a nuclear North Korea has been a combination of containment, deterrence, and limited engagement since 1994.
The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's ...
This book brings together contributions from fifteen distinguished experts examining various phases of "secret warfare." The development of nuclear weapons and the accompanying risk of escalation to global holocaust led...
With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security.
A nuclear response (and, therefore, the credibility of a deterrent stance) to nuclear terrorism poses several fundamental ... The extent to which such groups warrant a different set of responses from their state sponsors, therefore, ...
Nuclear, biological and chemical arms are the most inhumane of all weapons. They are rightly called weapons of mass destruction and weapons of terror. Designed to terrify as well as...
Michael Levi, “Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism,” Council Special Report 39 (2008), 4–5. 62. Jasen J. Castillo, “Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters,” Current History 102 (2003), 426. 63.