In 1999, the people of East Timor voted, overwhelmingly, against a proposal that would make their island an autonomous province of the Republic of Indonesia. Though it appeared that all of the factors for a successful transition from conflict to peace and stability were present and it was expected that establishing a new state would be fairly straightforward, surprisingly, to the International Community, this was not the case. This paper examines the United Nation's (UN) efforts in Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) as an important case for the study of SSR and postconflict stabilization and reconstruction. The authors argue that, despite presumed favorable conditions especially when contrasted against other contemporary peace support operations, the SSR program has failed. The paper begins with a brief history of the UN's efforts at SSR in Timor-Leste and then presents an analytical framework to assess these efforts based on the Guiding principles for stabilization and reconstruction, co-authored by the U.S. Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Using this framework, the paper highlights several critical junctures where the international community could have better leveraged and empowered the host-nation to improve reform outcomes.
The authors challenge the perception that Afghanistan is a lost cause and urge Washington to "adequately resource" its current policy toward the country.
Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk kitabı, evvela imparatorluğu dirilten nesil olan 1880'liler kuşağı, Balkan coğrafyası ve Mustafa Kemal'in aile kökeni ile başlıyor.
To answer this question, this work constructs a new theoretical model of foreign policy learning and presents two case studies to explore if learning occurred and to determine if conducting more rigorous tests of the theory is a worthwhile ...