Americans are averse to war and easily frustrated with wars of limited objectives. As such, Americans have a cultural aversion to counterinsurgency (COIN). Moreover, Americans have grown to expect total victory in the form of unconditional surrender as the termination of any conflict. We consider anything less as a loss or stalemate. The nature of COIN is inherently political, eighty percent political and twenty percent military. It has been said that there cannot be a purely military solution to an insurgency because insurgency is not a primarily military activity. As such, the use of the term "victory" as a description of the termination of conflict when the U.S. involves itself in COIN is problematic. The political nature of COIN and the American way of viewing war and termination of conflict require that we adopt a new definition of "victory" in a COIN operation. The term "victory," as the term is classically defined and as viewed by Americans, does not fit in COIN planning or execution owing to the nature of the objective in a COIN operation. In any conflict, the definition of what constitutes "victory" and who defines "victory" can remain fluid and this is especially true in COIN. A comparison of the British experience in Northern Ireland, which many consider victory, to the U.S. experience in Iraq, which many consider a loss, demonstrates the need for a better definition for the termination of a COIN operation. Based on analysis of the outcomes of historical case studies of COIN operations and what portends to be the future of warfare, this paper argues that we create a definition of "success" for the termination of a COIN operation and replace the term "victory" in COIN in the military's vocabulary.
35 Maybe it is not fair to blame T. E. Lawrence for this paradox—of reducible but unduplicable insight. 36 Lawrence was, after all, quite specific that his “Twenty-seven Articles,” which represented his compilation of what worked among ...
This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on COIN; analyzes COIN operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about...
On 21 February , Henry Hogan and Declan Martin spotted the SAS hide . Requesting orders , they were told to capture the soldiers that night . The SAS men were taken by surprise from the rear and , as they The SAS have always operated in ...
2, 62; Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 29, 1918, vol. 2, 144; Link, Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Sir Cecil Rice to the Foreign Office, December 27, 1917, vol. 45, 370; December 29, 1917, vol. 45, 393; Lord Robert Cecil to the ...
See Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice, New York: Potomac Books, 2002; ... Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice, New York: Knopf, 1971, challenges Taber's argument.
Though carefully documented, the book is written in an accessible style that makes it ideal for readers at all levels, from undergraduates to professional historians.
Busch, All the Way with JFK?, 84. 22. McGeorge Bundy, oral history interview #3, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Digital Oral History Program, http://archive2.jfklibrary.org/JFKOH/Bundy, %20McGeorge/JFKOH-MGB-03/JFKOH-MGB-03-TR.pdf ...
Lawrence Yates , Power Pack : U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic ( Fort Leavenworth , Kans .: Combat Studies Institute , 1988 ) , pp . 14–66 ; Blechman and Kaplan , Force Without War , pp . 291–93 , 303–08 ; Lawrence Greenberg ...
Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects.
Providing access to the capabilities of the world's leading police and security equipment and their suppliers, this guide reviews over 1300 items, including secure communications, access control, surveillance equipment, firearms and ...