This book is concerned with the conditions under which epistemic reasons provide justification for beliefs. The author draws on metaethical theories of reasons and normativity and then applies his theory to various contemporary debates in epistemology. In the first part of the book, the author outlines what he calls the dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons. The author offers and defends a dispositional account of how propositional and doxastic justification are related to one another. He then argues that the dispositional view has the resources to provide an acceptable account of the notion of the basing relation. In the second part of the book, the author examines how his theory of epistemic reasons bears on the issues involving perceptual reasons. He defends dogmatism about perceptual justification against conservatism and shows how his dispositional framework illuminates certain claims of dogmatism and its adherence to justification internalism. Finally, the author applies his dispositional framework to epistemological topics including the structure of defeat, self-knowledge, reasoning, emotions and motivational internalism. The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons demonstrates the value of employing metaethical considerations for the justification of beliefs and propositions. It will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology and metaethics.
This book sets out a theory of rationality applicable to both practical and theoretical reason.
This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles.
New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation J. Adam Carter, Patrick Bondy ... Philosophical Issues 14, Epistemology: 349–378. ... Vahid, H.: 2018, 'The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons', Philosophical Studies, ...
Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti. Tucker , Chris . 2011. Phenomenal conservatism and evidentialism in religious epistemology . ... The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons .
... and once we carry through the distinction between dispositional beliefs and mere dispositions to believe,26 it should ... The epistemological analogy I have been developing leads us to reject, as central for theoretical reason, ...
Belief : its structure, content, and relation to the will -- Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe -- Doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief -- Belief : a study in form, content, and justification -- Normativity and ...
The literature on theoretical reason has been dominated by epistemological concerns, treatments of practical reason by ethical concerns. This book overcomes the limitations of dealing with each separately.
This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue.
This volume explores two traditions in practical philosophy: action theory, which concerns the nature of motivation for human action, and praxiology, the study of human action.
... Louis P. Pojman , Lawrence Powers , Philip L. Quinn , William L. Rowe , Frederick Schmitt , Robert Shope , Eleonore Stump , Donna Summerfield , Marshall Swain , James Van Cleve , Jonathan Vogel , and Nicholas Wolterstorff .