This book begins with a survey of various readings of Locke as a materialist, as a substance dualist, and as a property dualist, and demonstrates that these inconsistent interpretations result from a general failure of modern commentators to notice the significance of Locke’s ‘mind-body nominalism’. By illuminating this largely overlooked aspect of Locke’s philosophy, this book reveals a common mistake of previous interpretations: that of treating what Locke conceives to be ‘nominal’ as real. The nominal symmetry that Locke posits between mind and body is distinct from any form of metaphysical dualism, whether substance dualism or property dualism. It is a brand of naturalism, but does not insist that the material is ontologically more basic than the mental or that the former determines the latter. On this view, the material and the mental both relate solely to a certain set of functional roles, rather than to an intrinsic property that plays these roles. The term ‘matter’ is thus rendered vague, and materialism is conceived as a precariously grounded ontological doctrine. Elaborating on this interpretation of Locke’s Essay, this book examines the insightful readings of Locke developed by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers such as Richard Burthogge, William Carroll, and Joseph Priestley. This book also seeks to clarify what Locke’s position would look like in a modern setting by noting some significant parallels with the ideas of leading contemporary philosophers such as Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and Colin McGinn.
This book proposes a theory of Locke's philosophy of mind structured around four topics in his Essay: epistemic humility, nominal dualism, mind-body functionalism, and his naturalistic approach to the human mind.
Each volume of this series of companions to major philosophers contains specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars, together with a substantial bibliography, and will serve as a reference work for students and non ...
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Schuurman, Paul. Ideas, Mental Faculties, and Method: The Logic of Ideas of Descartes and Locke and its Reception in the Dutch Republic, 1630–1750. Leiden: Brill, 2004. Schuurman, Paul.
... CL VIII 202).1 In his reply Locke warned his young friend against doing so: I desire you to stop your hand a little and forbear puting to the press the two discourses you mention they are very touchy subjects at this time and that ...
Provides new emphasis on Locke's theological commitments, As well as those of Descartes, Hobbes, Henry More and Robert Boyle.
Mais il faut bien que je cesse de reflechir sur toutes ces reflexions et qu'il y ait enfin quelque pensée qu'on laisse passer sans y penser; autrement on demeureroit tousjours sur la même chose': Nouveaux essais, II.i.19.
This book examines John Locke's claims about the nature and workings of language.
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In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate.
In this book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke’s critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point.