Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
This accessible introduction features case studies in online advertising, spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
While the converse of this statement does not hold , Proposition 2.7.1 ( b ) gives a partial converse : every nonnegative vector satisfying the conservation constraints is ( componentwise ) greater than or equal to a feasible flow on ...
This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field.
This theorem has been generalized to wider classes of nonatomic games; see Roughgarden (2005 a) for a survey, as well as a discussion of the price of anarchy of nonatomic selfish routing games with nonutilitarian objectives.
Introduces exciting new methods for assessing algorithms for problems ranging from clustering to linear programming to neural networks.
Part 1 focuses on the communication and computational complexity of computing an (approximate) Nash equilibrium. Part 2 focuses on applications of computational complexity theory to game theory and economics.
Earlier surveys include Cassady[1967],Wilson [1987a], and McAfee and MacMillan[1987]. These texts cover most of the canonical single-good and multi-unit auction types we discuss in the chapter. (One exception is the elimination auction, ...
How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design.
This book presents an introductory and up-to-date course on game theory addressed to mathematicians and economists, and to other scientists having a basic mathematical background.
Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent, self-interested agents.