Not since the 1960s have U.S. politicians, Republican or Democrat, campaigned on platforms defending big government, much less the use of regulation to help solve social ills. And since the late 1970s, "deregulation" has become perhaps the most ubiquitous political catchword of all. This book takes on the critics of government regulation. Providing the first major alternative to conventional arguments grounded in public choice theory, it demonstrates that regulatory government can, and on important occasions does, advance general interests. Unlike previous accounts, Regulation and Public Interests takes agencies' decision-making rules rather than legislative incentives as a central determinant of regulatory outcomes. Drawing from both political science and law, Steven Croley argues that such rules, together with agencies' larger decision-making environments, enhance agency autonomy. Agency personnel inclined to undertake regulatory initiatives that generate large but diffuse benefits (while imposing smaller but more concentrated costs) can use decision-making rules to develop socially beneficial regulations even over the objections of Congress and influential interest groups. This book thus provides a qualified defense of regulatory government. Its illustrative case studies include the development of tobacco rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration, ozone and particulate matter rules by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Forest Service's "roadless" policy for national forests, and regulatory initiatives by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.
And since the late 1970s, deregulation has become perhaps the most ubiquitous political catchword of all. This book takes on the critics of government regulation.
This volume is a study of regulation in context: in the context of the public policy it is designed to deliver; the law that enables, shapes and holds it to account; and the evolving societal and institutional frameworks within which it ...
While such themes are central to the book, this second edition has been substantially revised and updated, to take account of matters such as European Directives, the UK's Communications Act 2003, the process of reviewing the BBC's Charter, ...
Media Regulation in the Disinformation Age Philip M. Napoli ... 79, 120–121 Weinstein, James, 231n65 WhatsApp, 169, 261n44 Wheeler, Tom, 167 White, David Manning, 54–55 Whitney v. California (1927), 82–83 wire services, 55–56, 64 Wu,.
16 William Graebner, Coal—Mining Safety in the Progressive Period: The Political Economy of Reform (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1976), 139. For example, William C. Appleton and Joe G. Baker, “The Effect of Unionization ...
This book considerswhether these problems with the concept's current usage are inevitable and inherent, or whether it is possible to reinvigorate it.Feintuck begins by considering a variety of abstract concepts of public interest from the ...
Governance and the Interests of Citizens and Consumers Peter Lunt, Sonia Livingstone ... DCMS (Department for Culture, Media and Sport) (n.d.) 'Media literacy' (http:// ... (2007) Media Between Culture and Commerce. Bristol: Intellect.
This book clarifies factors that play an important role in securing the effectiveness of legal regimes that aim to protect public interests of the international community.
In this revision of the Godkin Lectures presented at Harvard University in November and December 1976, Charles L. Schultze examines the sources of this paradox.
Baron, David P., and David A. Besanko. 1984a. “Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing.” RAND ]ournal ofEconomics 15 (4): 447470. Baron, David P., and David A. Besanko. 1984b. “Regulation and Information in a Continuing ...