Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.
Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy?
Micklethwait, J., and Wooldridge, A. (2003). The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea. London: Phoenix. Mikler, J. (2008). Sharing Sovereignty for Global Regulation: The Cases of Fuel Economy and Online Gambling, ...
The large business corporation has become a governing institution in national and global politics. This study offers a critical account of its political dominance and lack of democratic legitimacy.
Cioffi argues that highly politicized reform of corporate governance law has reshaped power relations within the public corporation in favor of financial interests, contributed to the profound crises of capitalism, and eroded its political ...
In the mid-1960s former Supreme Court justice Arthur Goldberg recommended that boards of directors have their own professional staffs. When Justice Goldberg was a member of the board of TWA, he tried unsuccessfully to obtain funding for ...
Capitalism, both the paradigm and practice, sits at the intersection of these dual aspirations, and the essays in this volume, written by some of the worlds leading economists, philosophers and business academics, explore the tensions ...
Natural Lies 275 Nature 275 Nature Conservancy Council 269 Neave, Airey 74 negative campaigning 98, 103, 104 Neill Committee see Committee on Standards in Public Life Neuropathogenesis Group, Edinburgh 273 New Britain, ...
Political Context, Corporate Impact Mark J. Roe. -Backlash ' . ... In Employees and Corporate Governance , edited by Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe , 194. ... Stengel , Arndt . ' Directors ' Powers and Shareholders BIBLIOGRAPHY 215.
... G. 8 Council on Hemispheric Affairs (CHA) 19 Countrywide Financial 79–80 Covert, B.: and Konczal, M. 89 Crane, ... M. 11, 36 Foxconn 4 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (2009) 77 Friedman Foundation 134 Friedrichs, D.: and Rothe, ...
On Hughes's life and career more generally, see Dexter Perkins, Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic Statesmanship (1956); Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence (1966); Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans ...