In The End of Grand Strategy, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge the common view of grand strategy as unitary. They eschew prescription of any one specific approach, chosen from a spectrum that stretches from global primacy to restraint and isolationism, in favor of describing what America's military actually does, day to day. They argue that a series of fundamental recent changes in the global system, the inevitable jostling of bureaucratic politics, and the practical limitations of field operations combine to ensure that each presidential administration inevitably resorts to a variety of strategies. Proponents of different American grand strategies have historically focused on the pivotal role of the Navy. In response, Reich and Dombrowski examine six major maritime operations, each of which reflects one major strategy. One size does not fit all, say the authors--the attempt to impose a single overarching blueprint is no longer feasible. Reich and Dombrowski declare that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead. The End of Grand Strategy is essential reading for policymakers, military strategists, and analysts and critics at advocacy groups and think tanks.
Transforming Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and Network Centric Warfare
Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy
In Adapting America's Security Paradigm and Security Agenda, they conclude that managing the complex dimensions of the 21st-century security environment goes beyond force levels and firepower.
The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare
How these inherent tensions or 'contradictions' are resolved shapes the efficacy of the military doctrine and reflects the character of its users.
The 1982 Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced the idea of an operational level of war encompassing the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations.