Bidding More Precisely: Revised
- ISBN-10
- 1543484875
- ISBN-13
- 9781543484878
- Category
- Games & Activities
- Pages
- 198
- Language
- English
- Published
- 2018-04-27
- Publisher
- Xlibris Corporation
- Author
- Ken Casey
Description
This book is designed to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the three major bidding systems: Standard American, 2/1, and Precision Club, as well as the Bergen Raise system. Solutions are offered for each disadvantage. Proposals for additional conventions, such as the weak NT and Jacoby transfers, are contained in a simplified model chart of each system. There are also innovative proposals for showing a five-card major, overcalls, and slam bidding. You will also find chapters on various conventions, irregularities in bidding, probabilities, filling out the convention card, playing in a team event, and scoring.
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