Introduction -- Approach -- Insurgency -- Chronic insurgency and shadow governance -- Counterinsurgency -- Historical analysis : four different outcomes -- Group 1 : insurgent victories -- Group 2 : government victories -- Group 3 : degenerate insurgencies -- Group 4 : success through co-option -- Lessons -- A strategy of co-option -- Implications for Iraq and Afghanistan -- Conclusion.
After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions.
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it.
... Heads We Win The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN), Occasional Paper (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007). 156. Author's interviews with village communities in Mpuielo, Jatinga, and Sonpijang villages, Dima Hasao District, Assam, 17 ...
In 1995, former Maine Senator George Mitchell was appointed U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland. He subsequently crafted the Mitchell Principles, six ground rules that would facilitate a final agreement to the conflict.
In Networks of Rebellion, Paul Staniland explains why insurgent leaders differ so radically in their ability to build strong organizations and why the cohesion of armed groups changes over time during conflicts.
The world has discovered that the hatreds behind ethnic conflicts often are very difficult to suppress--and even harder to dissipate. It also has discovered that military interventions alone rarely attenuate...
RAND studied 89 modern insurgency cases to test conventional understanding about how insurgencies end.
A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.
Extreme ethnic violence has been a sordid feature of the post-Cold War world. The discontent underlying the violence sometimes flares into insurgency, threatening the cohesion of the state. Typically, primordial...
If this is true, the United States should only undertake counterinsurgency support in the most pressing instances and as part of an equitable, legitimate, and broad-based multinational coalition.