In the years following WWI, the U.S. Congress was more interested in disarmament than in funding national defense. For the military services this meant lean budgets and skeleton operating forces. Billy Mitchell’s War recounts the struggle between the Army and Navy air arms for the resources needed to define and establish the role of aviation within their respective services in the period between the two world wars. When Billy Mitchell returned from WW I, he brought with him the deep-seated belief that air power had made armies and navies obsolete. When Congress rejected the concept of a unified air service in 1920, Mitchell and his supporters turned on the Navy, seeking to substitute the Air Service as the nation's first line of defense. While Mitchell proved that aircraft could sink a battleship with the bombing of the Ostfriesland in 1921, he was unable to convince the General Staff of the Army, the General Board of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or Congress of the need for an independent air force. When Mitchell turned to the pen to discredit the Navy, he was convicted by his own words and actions in a court-martial that captivated the nation, and was forced to resign in 1925. Rather then ending the rivalry for air power, Mitchell’s resignation set the stage for the ongoing dispute between the two services in the years immediately before WWII.
A Question of Loyalty plunges into the seven-week Washington trial of Gen.
The book's focus is on Mitchell's campaign for increased spending for building new and improved aircraft and his vision of the role aircraft would play in any future wars, especially against naval ships.
Lieutenant Colonel James E. Fechet , chief of Training and Operations , was constantly looking for ideas that would deliver ... Virginia , aviators he informed Baker that since the navy would provide the ship , it would 118 BILLY MITCHELL.
Primary-source documents, memoirs, and firsthand testimonies deliver an exhaustive background to Mitchell’s prescient reports. Now, historian Ronald J. Drez finally gives credence to the man called the “Cassandra General.”
Martin B–10—low wing, all-metal monoplane bombers with every technological improvement available and twice the speed of those Mitchell had known— were already in hand, and by 1935 the four-engine Boeing B–17 was already on the horizon.
Biografi over og gennemgang af general Mitchels betydning for udviklingen af luftkrigsdoktriner.
Daniels, Navy and the Nation, 302; Baer, American Sea Power, 58–59; Mary Klachko, “William Shepherd Benson: Naval General Staff American Style,” in Admirals of the New Steel Navy, ed. James C. Bradford (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute ...
His wisdom is as fresh and relevant today as it was at the beginning of the century when he offered it. This collection of Mitchell's thoughts on air power offered here should illuminate the vision offered by Global Engagement.
In the Netherlands, usually a NATO hawk, leading politicians took part in an antiwar protest after these attacks, as they also did in neutral Sweden. In turn, this opposition affected the perception of earlier bombing, ...
Mitchell, a proponent of wartime air strength, saw the future of flight and indeed advanced it in ways recognized abroad as well as at home.