The book examines the evolution of American naval thinking in the post-Cold War era. It recounts the development of the U.S. Navy’s key strategic documents from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the release in 2007 of the U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. An insightful and penetrating intellectual history, it critically analyzes the Navy’s way of thinking and ideas, and recounts how they interacted with those that govern U.S. strategy to shape the course of U.S. naval strategy in the post-Cold War era. The book explains how the Navy arrived at its current strategic outlook and why it took nearly two decades for the Navy to develop a maritime strategy in an era in which the relative saliency of such should have been more apparent to Navy leaders. The author, a Navy captain, doesn’t shy from taking to task the institution and its leaders for their narrow worldview and failure to understand the virtues and contributions of American sea power, particularly in an era of globalization. It describes the reasons behind the Navy’s late development of a maritime strategy during the post-Cold War era. It recounts the origins and evolution of the Navy’s distinctive way of thinking and ideas about sea power since before the Second World War, particularly how they shaped and were shaped by the Navy’s Cold War experiences. It argues that the Navy’s way of thinking and ideas, and how they interacted those that governed U.S. strategy, bounded and channeled U.S. naval strategy away from a maritime approach as they had during the Cold War. It took an implausible series of events for one to emerge, including a losing war in Iraq—that called into question long-standing assumptions about U.S. strategy, threatened the Navy’s relevance, and brought about a systemically oriented U.S. strategic approach—and the appearance of two maritime-minded Navy leaders. It focuses on the process by which the Navy developed its strategic documents, the process where institutional ideas are assembled, negotiated, and reshaped in light of other influences—i.e., the direction of U.S. strategy, budgetary constraints, perceived threats, and the competing interests of other domestic and institutional actors—because even though the subject is American naval thinking (and here it must be emphasized that the concept itself is somewhat metaphorical as only people can think), that is how real strategy is made.
A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy is a deliberately compact introductory work aimed at junior seafarers, those who make decisions affecting the sea services, and those who educate seafarers and decision-makers.
Notably, this is a comment Gordon Adams pithily used to describe James Mattis, then Donald Trump's nominee as Secretary of Defense. Gordon Adams, “If You Have a Mattis, Everything Looks like a Nail,” Foreign Policy, 2 December 2016, ...
A Future for the Community Shipping Industry: Measures to Improve the Operating Conditions of Community Shipping
Naval strategy, 1945-1980 : the post-World War II transoceanic strategy -- The 1980s : the strategic environment of the early 1980s -- The Goldwater-Nichols Act and Navy strategy -- The Gulf War, Revolution in Military Affairs, and ...
This volume is published to help begin that process of wider historical understanding and generalization for the subject of strategic thinking in the U.S. Navy during the last phases of the Cold War.
Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought provides an in-depth introductionand a means to stimulate discussion about the theories of Mahan and Corbett.
Two associate professors of strategy at the Naval War College assess how the rise of Chinese sea power will affect the United States maritime strategy in Asia and discuss the sea-power theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, now popular in China.
Thomas Kane's study examines the formulation of naval strategy in the People's Republic of China and reveals the obstacles and challenges that planners face in their path towards a truly powerful and globally-influential, deep-sea navy.
This book explores for the first time an overall strategy for maritime security integrating these issues into a single framework.
This book makes a valuable and original contribution to the study of strategic thinking of one of the greatest naval theoreticians of all time.