Challenging several longstanding notions about the American way of war, this book examines US strategic and operational practice from 1775 to 2014. It surveys all major US wars from the War of Independence to the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as most smaller US conflicts to determine what patterns, if any, existed in American uses of force. Contrary to many popular sentiments, Echevarria finds that the American way of war is not astrategic, apolitical, or defined by the use of overwhelming force. Instead, the American way of war was driven more by political considerations than military ones, and the amount of force employed was rarely overwhelming or decisive. Echevarria discovers that most conceptions of American strategic culture fail to hold up to scrutiny, and that US operational practice has been closer to military science than to military art. This book should be of interest to military practitioners and policymakers, students and scholars of military history and security studies, and general readers interested in military history and the future of military power.
After McClellan was removed as Commanding General of the Army in March , 1862 , and until Halleck took up that post in July , Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton personally directed the armies . They conceived and supervised ...
12 Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (New York: Free Press, 1999), p. 7. 13 John Costello, The Pacific War (New York: HarperCollins, 1982), pp. 125–26. 14 Admiral James Richardson, commander of the ...
This new work features the fresh thinking of twenty-eight leading authors from a variety of military and national security disciplines.
The author examines the principal characteristics and ideas associated with the American way of war, past and present.
Neimeyer for the first time reveals who really served in the army during the Revolution and why.
This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war.
Focusing on an age of rapid technological change and increased competition among nations, Imagining Future Wars compares visions of warfare's future as imagined by military professionals and educated civilians.
As an observer of the Russo-Japanese fighting in Manchuria in 1904-5, Morrison learned what so many European attaches also seemed to discover: that even in the face of trenches, barbed wire, and the firepower of machine guns and modern ...
Whereas Mitchell had made a name for himself with his accomplishments in the war, his brand of heroism contrasted sharply with the unrewarded courage of the average person. 2.3 Mitchell's First Principles Ironically, for all Mitchell's ...
He placed not quite half of his forces under the command of Daniel Morgan and sent them west past the Catawba River, and took the remainder east and south to the Pee Dee River. This choice seemed to fly in the face of conventional ...