On the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki comes this heart-pounding account of the war-room drama inside the cabinets of the United States and Japan that led to Armageddon on August 6, 1945. Here are the secret strategy sessions, fierce debates, looming assassinations, and planned invasions that resulted in history’s first use of nuclear weapons in combat, and the ensuing chaotic days as the Japanese government struggled to respond to the reality of nuclear war. During the closing months of World War II, as America’s strategic bombing campaign incinerated Japan’s cities, two military giants locked in a death embrace of cultural differences and diplomatic intransigence. The leaders of the United States called for the “unconditional surrender” of the Japanese Empire while developing history’s deadliest weapon and weighing an invasion, Downfall, that would have dwarfed D-Day. Their enemy responded with a last-ditch plan termed Ketsu-Go, which called for the suicidal resistance of every able-bodied man and woman in “The Decisive Battle” for the homeland. But had Emperor Hirohito’s generals miscalculated how far the Americans had come in developing the atomic bomb? How close did President Harry Truman come to ordering the invasion of Japan? Within the Japanese Supreme Council at the Direction of War, a.k.a. “The Big Six,” Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō risked assassination in his crusade to convince his dysfunctional government, dominated by militarist fanatics, to save his country from annihilation. Despite Allied warnings of Japan’s “prompt and utter destruction” and that the Allies would “brook no delay,” the Big Six remained defiant. They refused to surrender even after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. How did Japanese leaders come to this impasse? The answers lie in this nearly day-by-day account of the struggle to end the most destructive conflict in history.
Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
"A new edition with a final chapter written forty years after the explosion."
Lewis took LeMay on his first B-29 flight and showed him the challenges it presented. As soon as they landed, LeMay promoted Lewis to captain, right there on the field. Lindbergh and LeMay weren't the only ones who praised Lewis.
A more nuanced reading along classic revisionist lines is offered in Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima ... J. Hogan, “The Enola Gay Controversy: History, Memory, and the Politics of Presentation,” in Michael J. Hogan, ed., ...
As Hersey and his editors prepared his article for publication, they kept the story secret—even from most of their New Yorker colleagues.
There were now three minutes to go before the brand-new bomber reached the aiming point. It was the first of the replacement aircraft that Parsons had deemed necessary. It had arrived at Wendover on March 9 and had been closely examined ...
Most importantly, Gallicchio reveals how the policy of unconditional surrender has shaped our memory and our understanding of World War II.
This book discusses the decision to use the atomic bomb. Libraries and scholars will find it a necessary adjunct to their other studies by Pulitzer-Prize author Herbert Feis on World War II. Originally published in 1966.
This New York Times bestselling account of books parachuted to soldiers during WWII is a “cultural history that does much to explain modern America” (USA Today).
... 1 Niblo, Winfield, 1 Nielsen, Olive V. McDaniel, 1 Nihon Hidankyō (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations), 1 Nippon Eiga-sha (Japanese Film Company), 1 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation, ...