Scholars, students and teachers of public economics will welcome this volume that, by making some of the key contributions in the field more widely accessible, will provoke discussion, debate and further research.
Richardson offers a careful analysis of US federal agencies examining the interaction between executive and legislative branches of government, combining Austrian economics, Public Choice and Evolutionary methodology in his approach.
This book will be of interest to postgraduates and researchers focussing on Economic Theory, Public Choice, Institutional Economics and Political Science, as well as to those working in the public sector interested in Public Administration, ...
One avenue is through congressional committee oversight of specific agencies (see Weingast and Moran 1983; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). Another is through the budget appropriations process (see Fenno 1966; Wil- davsky 1979; and Weingast ...
Their narrative coherently frames the scholarship of the last half century, and persuasively applies it to the recurring problems facing groups, markets, and whole societies.”—Kenneth A. Shepsle, Harvard University, USA This book ...
In this fully revised second edition of a popular text, Patrick McNutt presents more ideas and challenges to all those interested in political economy and public choice. Chapter 2 looks...
Bureaucracy and Public Choice gives a theoretical and empirical appraisal of modern bureaucracy. It argues that bureaucracies and bureaucrats are indispensable in the making and implementation of public choice. Explanations...
... M. , 32 , 34 , 37 , 215n19 , 227n10 217n1 , 219n13 , 226n72 Jones , L. , 136 , 139 , 145 , 147 , 149 , 150-1 , 157–8 ... 66 , 71 , Levin , R. , 224n54 84 , 214n9 , 214n10 , 218n3 , 218n7 , 219n15 , 219n18 , 221n27 , 221n29 , MacAvoy ...
In this volume, a group of international scholars address issues relating to community wellbeing and the role of politics, law and economics in Europe and Japan in achieving human-centred symbiotic governance.
This volume contains the papers, along with the discussant's remarks, presented at a symposium on "Government Inefficiency" held at Diessen am Ammersee, Germany, on 22-25 July, 1980.
This is the first book to develop a formal theory of supply by bureaus. Niskanen develops an original and comprehensive theory of the behavior of bureaus with the institutions of representative government.