The intention of this paper is to examine two broad themes which are relevant to military doctrine in general as a cohesive body of military thinking. The first will explore the problem of defining 'military doctrine' and its purpose. Having a common understanding of what is meant by 'military doctrine' is something of fundamental importance if doctrine is to have any utility to its users. The second will consider the inherent tensions in doctrine when trying to formulate it, disseminate it or apply it. How these inherent tensions or 'contradictions' are resolved shapes the efficacy of the military doctrine and reflects the character of its users.
Transforming Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and Network Centric Warfare
Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy
In The End of Grand Strategy, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge the common view of grand strategy as unitary.
In Adapting America's Security Paradigm and Security Agenda, they conclude that managing the complex dimensions of the 21st-century security environment goes beyond force levels and firepower.
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